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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Does the Supreme Court Extend the
Definition of Obscenity To "I Know It When
I Hear It?"
Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC,
109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Sable Communications, which offered sexually-oriented prerecorded telephone messages, brought suit to enjoin the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) and the Department of Justice from enforcing section 223(b) of the Communications Act of
1934,1 which, as amended, imposed a blanket prohibition on obscene, as well as indecent, interstate commercial telephone
messages.' Sable claimed that the absolute ban on obscene and indecent speech embodied in section 223(b) was repugnant to the
1. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1982), as amended by Act of April 28, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100297, § 6101, 102 Stat. 424. Section 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended in
April of 1988, and as it appeared when Sable commenced this action, provided:
(b)(1) Whoever knowingly(A) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communication, by
means of telephone, makes (directly or by recording device) any obscene or indecent communication for commercial purposes to any person, regardless of
whether the maker of such communication placed the call; or
(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control to be used for
an activity prohibited by subparagraph (A), shall be fined not more than $50,000
or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2834 & n.4 (1989). The
April 1988 amendment proscribed "indecent as well as obscene interstate telephone communications directed to any person regardless of age." Id. at 2834. Before the Court noted
probable jurisdiction, Congress again amended section 223(b). Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7524, 102 Stat. 4502 (1988). This most
recent amendment places the prohibitions against obscene and indecent commercial telephone messages in separate subsections. Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2834 n.5. This separation essentially removed any issue of severability from the case. Id. at 2835 n.6.
2. Sable also sought a declaratory judgment that the indecency and obscenity provisions of the amended section 223(b) were violative of the first amendment. Id. at 2832.
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first and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution.'
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California held that "the first amendment does not permit a flatout ban of indecent as opposed to obscene speech"' and issued a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the enforcement of Section
223(b) as it applied to indecent speech.5 The District Court refused, however, to grant Sable's request for an injunction against
the enforcement of the ban on obscene telephone messages.'
On appeal,7 the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed.'
Specifically, the Court had to resolve two issues: (1) whether the
prohibition against providing obscene interstate commercial telephone messages in Section 223(b) was consonant with the first
amendment; and (2) whether the prohibition against providing indecent interstate commercial telephone messages in Section 223(b)
was sufficiently narrow to survive a constitutional attack. The
Court held that "[b]ecause the statute's denial of adult access to
telephone messages which are indecent but not obscene far exceed
that which is necessary to limit the access of minors to such
messages," the complete ban of indecent speech in section 223(b)
violates the first amendment.9 However, the Court affirmed the
district court's refusal to enjoin enforcement of the statute as it
applied to obscene telephone communications, rejecting, as did the
district court, Sable's argument that the statute unconstitutionally
created a national standard of obscenity.10 This Note analyzes the
Supreme Court's holding and suggests that unresolved issues
remain.
3. Id.
4. Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 692 F.Supp. 1208, 1209 (C.D. Cal.
1988) (quoting Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d
1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 1987)).
5. Sable, 692 F. Supp. at 1210.
6. Id.
7. Sable appealed to the Ninth Circuit the trial court's holding that the FCC's ban on
obscene speech was constitutional. The FCC's direct appeal to the Supreme Court on the
indecency issue had the effect of transferring Sable's Ninth Circuit appeal directly to the
Supreme Court, allowing both issues to be determined simultaneously. Sable, 109 S. Ct. at
2832-33 n.2.
8. Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989).
9. Id. at 2839.
10. Id. at 2835-36.
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II.

THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION

A. History
In Roth v. United States," the Supreme Court, for the first
time, expressly held that obscenity was not protected by the first
amendment. 12 Defining "obscene material" as "material dealing
with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interests," the Court
enunciated a test for lower courts to apply when attempting to determine whether allegedly obscene material does indeed fall within
that unprotected realm: "whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest."' 3
In 1966, the Supreme Court decided two companion cases
which significantly revised the Roth test. In Memoirs v. Massachusetts," the Court limited the scope of obscenity, rendering the
Roth test more difficult to apply. Specifically, Memoirs modified
the Roth test by concluding that a work cannot be proscribed as
obscene unless found to be "utterly without redeeming social
value." 5
In 1973, in Miller v. California,6 the Supreme Court rejected
the definition of obscenity it had formulated in Memoirs' 7 and delineated the current tripartite test. When assessing whether a work
is obscene under the Miller test, the fact finder must decide:

(a) Whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole,

appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.'"
11. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). In Roth, the defendant was convicted of mailing obscene advertisements in violation of the federal obscenity statute, currently codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1461 (1982).
12. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
13. Id. at 489.
14. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
15. Id. at 419 (emphasis in original).
16. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller had been convicted of mailing unsolicited sexually explicit material in violation of a California law which had incorporated the obscenity test
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Memoirs. Id.
17. For a discussion of how the Miller test differs from the test in Memoirs, see Main,
The Neglected Prong of the Miller Test for Obscenity: Serious Literary, Artistic, Political
or Scientific Value, 11 S. ILL. U.L.J. 1159 (1987).
18. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25. In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973),
the companion case to Miller, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its announcement in Roth that
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Miller remains the relevant constitutional standard when assessing
whether material is or is not obscene. Accordingly, it was of critical
importance to the Sable Court's scrutiny of section 223(b).
B. Obscene Speech
In Sable, the Supreme Court first addressed the district
court's refusal to enjoin enforcement of the prohibition in section
223(b) of obscene commercial telephone messages.19 As the Court
clearly noted, it was not endeavoring to decide what is or is not
obscene, but simply to determine whether the Constitution empowered Congress to proscribe the transmission of obscene telephone messages.20 Sable's main contention was that section 223(b)
created an impermissible national standard of obscenity by requiring national telephone services to fashion their messages to conform with the least tolerant community, an unconstitutional requirement in light of Miller's first prong.21 Sable argued that it was
a national telephone service because its messages were received nationally, and, that being the case, it was therefore unconstitutional
for the FCC to require that Sable's communications to the more
tolerant communities be limited to what would be acceptable in
the least tolerant community.22
In holding that "there is no constitutional stricture. against
Congress' prohibiting the interstate transmission of obscene commercial telephone recordings," the Supreme Court emphatically rejected Sable's claim." Comparing section 223(b) to the federal
statutes prohibiting the mailing of obscene materials and the
broadcasting of obscene messages, the Court refused to find that
section 223(b) establishes a national standard of obscenity in contravention of Miller's community standard requirement.24 Clearly,
the Court noted, "the Miller standards ... apply to federal legislation. 12 As a result, they continued, "[t]here is no constitutional

barrier under Miller to prohibiting communications that are obthe first amendment's protection of speech does not extend to obscenity. Id. at 54. The
Court also recognized that there are legitimate state interests in curbing the flow of commercialized obscenity. Id. at 57.
19. Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2835 (1989).
20. Id.
21. Id. The first prong of Miller requires a fact finder to apply "contemporary community standards" when determining whether a work is obscene. Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 24 (1973).
22. Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2835.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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scene in some communities under local standards even though they
are not obscene in others."26
The Court suggested that Sable, in order to comply with
Miller's community standard principle, could tailor its messages to
the communities it chooses to serve.27 However, the costs Sable undoubtedly will incur in developing a system to screen incoming
calls, the Court noted, do not affect the constitutionality of a law
necessitating such costs.2 8 Ultimately, the Court claimed, where a
communicator, like Sable, directs its message to various communities with differing local standards, the communicator "ultimately
bears the burden of complying with the prohibition on obscene
messages.""9
C.

Indecent Speech

The Court next addressed the more problematic issue concerning the constitutionality of the blanket prohibition on indecent
speech embodied in section 223(b). The District Court, in enjoining the enforcement of section 223(b) against indecent speech,
had concluded that although the government does have a legitimate interest in shielding children from indecent dial-a-porn
messages, section 223(b) was not a narrowly drawn mechanism to
advance that interest and thus violated the first amendment.30 The
Supreme Court affirmed the injunction.
Because indecent speech receives first amendment protection,
the government can regulate the content of indecent speech only to
further a compelling governmental interest.' Moreover, the regulation implemented must be the least restrictive means available to
advance this compelling governmental interest.3 2 Citing Ginsberg
3 4 the Supreme Court
v. New York 3' and New York v. Ferber,
in
Id. at 2836.
27. Id.
26.

28. Id. The Court suggested that Sable has various options in attempting to provide
messages which are compatible with community standards, including the hiring of operators
to determine the origin of the calls or even arranging with the telephone company to screen
or block calls from outside a certain community. Id.
29. Id. The constitutionality of Miller's definition of obscenity was not challenged by
Sable, but some commentators believe that the community standards test is too indefinite
and amorphous to endure as a constitutional principle. See, e.g., Wright, Defining Obscenity: The Criterion of Value, 22 NEw ENG. L. REv. 315, 335-338 (1987-88).
30. Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2836.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
34. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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Sable accepted the government's contention that there is a compelling interest in protecting minors from indecent literature.35
The Court, however, did not accept the government's assertion
that the complete ban on indecent speech in section 223(b) constituted the least restrictive means available to advance this compelling interest and held that the blanket prohibition on indecent
speech was unconstitutional."
The government argued that a total ban on indecent telephone
service was necessary because any lesser restriction would not effectively prevent minors from accessing Sable's services. 3 The
Court, however, was not persuaded, primarily because the FCC itself previously had determined that more sophisticated methods
such as scrambling systems, access codes, and credit card payments were effective alternatives to a complete ban." The Court
conceded that, in general, deference should be given to a legislative
finding that no acceptable alternative existed;3 9 however, in the instant case, the Court stated, the requirement of "deference... [to]
legislative findings [does] not foreclose our independent judgment
of the facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law... [and] the
congressional record contains no legislative findings that would justify us in concluding that there is no constitutionally acceptable
less restrictive means."'4 0 The usual deference cast aside, the Court
concluded that the "FCC's technological approach to restricting
dial-a-porn messages to adults who seek them would be extremely
effective ... [and, as a result,] § 223(b) is not a narrowly tailored
effort to serve the compelling interest of preventing minors from
35. Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2836. According to at least one commentator the government
also could have claimed a legitimate interest in protecting women from sexual degradation.
See Dworkin, Pornography os a Civil Rights Issue for Women, 58 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 55
(1987-88).
36. Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2837. Cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (reasoning
that the adult population cannot be restricted to reading only what is permissible for
children).
37. Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2837.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2838. Congress, in amending section 223(b) in 1988, had expressed its view
that, short of a complete ban on indecent messages, there was no sufficient method of
preventing access to dial-a-porn to minors. Id. at 2837.
40. Id. at 2838. The government also relied on FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S.
726 (1978), in which the Court held the FCC has some power to regulate indecent radio
broadcasts. However, the Sable Court distinguished Pacifica because of the unique attributes of radio: specifically, the unique accessibility of radio messages to children and the
ability of a radio broadcast to intrude into the home without warning. Sable, 109 S. Ct. at
2837. For an in-depth analysis of FCC v. Pacifica, see Comment, The FCC's Regulation of
Broadcast Indecency: A Broadened Approach for Removing Immorality from the Airwaves,
43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 871 (1989).
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being exposed to indecent telephone messages." '
III.

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

The Supreme Court's narrow holding in Sable, that the federal government may prohibit obscene interstate commercial telephone messages,' but that the first amendment proscribes the
government from imposing a blanket prohibition on indecent
messages,' 8 left three issues unresolved. First, the Court has not
defined obscenity in the context of pre-recorded telephone
messages. Similarly, it has failed to expound on the meaning of
indecent in that context. Finally, the Court has not announced
how much deference courts must give to legislative findings when
deciding obscenity issues."
A.

How to Define Obscene?

The Supreme Court has found it difficult to define obscenity. 5
In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton," Justice Brennan argued in
dissent that the imposition of criminal penalties for the distribution of obscene materials to consenting adults is unconstitutional
because "the concept of 'obscenity' cannot be defined with sufficient specificity and clarity to provide fair notice to persons who
create and distribute sexually oriented materials, to prevent substantial erosion of protected speech as a byproduct of the attempt
to suppress unprotected speech, and to avoid very costly institutional harms.' 4 7 In this light, Sable could have argued that although the blanket prohibition on obscene speech is not facially
unconstitutional, the Miller test for obscenity is unconstitutionally
vague when applied to pre-recorded phone messages.
Further, Justice Brennan, in dissenting from the Sable Court's
treatment of section 223(b) when applied to obscene telephone
messages, argued that the complete ban of obscene telephone
messages is unconstitutionally overbroad and, hence, facially inva41. Sable, 109 S.Ct. at 2838-39.
42. Id. at 2835.
43. Id.
44. The Supreme Court expressly declined to address at least two of the questions
when it stated: "The case before us today does not require us to decide what is obscene or
indecent." Id.
45. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(claiming that the effort to define obscenity constitutes an exercise in "trying to define what
may be indefinable.").
46. 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 103.
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lid.48 This absolutist approach, originally articulated by Justice
Brennan in his Paris Adult Theatre dissent, is not currently the
majority view; however, the Sable Court should have seen that
Brennan's approach is more helpful when applied to phone
messages. 9 It simply is not possible uniformly to determine the
point at which heavy breathing, sighing, or moaning reaches the
level of obscenity."
Although the Supreme Court has held that expression by
words can be legally obscene, 5 1 future litigants should continue attempting to convince the Court that it should not classify pre-recorded phone messages as obscene because it is impossible to apply
the Miller tripartite test in the dial-a-porn context. However, until
the Supreme Court reformulates its definition of obscenity or, alternatively, recognizes the practical worth of Justice Brennan's approach and removes obscenity from the realm of the unprotected,
the lower courts will have to struggle with the problem on their
2
own.
B. How to Define Indecent?
The Supreme Court has not found it any easier to delineate a
test for determining when a phone message is indecent. However,
it is equally imperative that the Court formulate a workable test
for indecency for two reasons. First, an indecency standard is necessary to allow lower courts to distinguish indecent speech from
speech which is obscene. As the result in Sable poignantly indicates, the difference is critical. Second, an indecency standard also
will enable the lower courts to distinguish indecent speech from
neutral speech. Again, the difference is critical because neutral
speech deserves full first amendment protection, while indecent
speech does not. Justice Brennan's contention that the imposition
48. Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2840 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. One skeptical commentator has stated that "the acceptable, and therefore the
nonacceptable, is a constantly changing norm in our society. What may be permissible
under one authority may change with the next election." Note, People v. Freeman-No End
Runs on the Obscenity Field or You Can't Catch Me from Behind, 9 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 69,
94 (1989).
50. In the dial-a-porn context, the Supreme Court may have to create an "I know it
when I hear it" test to define obscenity.
51. See, e.g., Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 147 (1973) (holding that obscene material
in book form is not entitled to first amendment protection merely because of the absence of
pictorial content).
52. See Taylor, Hard-CorePornography: A Proposal for a Per Se Rule, 21 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 255 (1987-88)(arguing the Court should impose a per se rule with respect to obscenity because of the difficulty of defining obscenity adequately in all contexts).
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of punishment for the transmission of obscene commercial communications runs afoul of the Constitution because of the Court's inability to sufficiently define obscenity is equally applicable to indecent communications.5 Until the Court articulates a workable test
for identifying indecent speech or, alternatively, decides that no
workable test is possible and instead extends to indecent speech
the full protection of the first amendment, the lower courts will
have to struggle with the concept of indecency on their own.5
In Pope v. Illinois,5 5 Justice Scalia suggested that the Supreme Court re-examine the Miller test. 6 Instead of labelling all
speech as obscene, indecent, or neutral, Scalia essentially advocates that the Court place speech along a continuum. Under this
sliding scale approach, "[tihe more narrow the understanding of
what is 'obscene,' and hence the more pornographic what is embraced within the residual category of 'indecency,' the more reasonable it becomes to insist upon greater assurance of insulation
' 57
from minors.
Although Scalia's approach eliminates the necessity of defining obscenity and indecency, it still provides no guidance as to
where to place various types of speech along the continuum, nor
does it reveal where on this continuum first amendment protection
attaches. For these reasons, Scalia's methodology provides no more
guidance than the Supreme Court's current approach.
C.

How Much Deference to the Legislature?
1. How Effective Must the Regulations Be?

In Sable, the government argued that it had a legitimate interest in preventing all minors from accessing dial-a-porn services and
that a blanket prohibition was the least restrictive means available
to promote this interest.85 The Court conceded that "[iut may well
be that there is no fail-safe method of guaranteeing that never will
a minor be able to access the dial-a-porn system." 59 But the majority did not require an absolute foolproof plan; instead, the Court
53. Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2840 (1989).
54. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (claiming
that the "Court has not been able to enunciate [a national standard], and it would be unreasonable to expect local courts to divine one").
55. 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 1923.
57. Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2839.
58. Id. at 2837.
59. Id. at 2838.
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stated that the FCC's technological approach "would be extremely
effective and only a few of the most enterprising and disobedient
young people will manage to secure access to such messages."6 0
With this reasoning, the majority avoided determining how many
disobedient minors would be too many. As Justice Scalia summarized in his concurrence, "We could as well have said: the FCC's
technological approach... [is] inadequate,since some enterprising
and disobedient young people will manage to secure access to such
messages."6 In essence, the Court has left another issue dangling.
Perpetuating the inability of the lower courts and the FCC to establish some determinative principles with respect to dial-a-porn,
the Supreme Court has failed to articulate exactly how effective a
regulation must be to pass constitutional scrutiny.
2.

Which Alternative is the Least Restrictive?

Additionally, the Sable Court did not say which mechanism,
or what combination of the numerous available mechanisms, will
constitute the least restrictive means of shielding minors from diala-porn. As noted above, if the government opts to regulate the content of indecent speech, it must do so by implementing the least
restrictive means available.2 The FCC, in an attempt to find the
least restrictive alternative to prevent minors from accessing diala-porn messages, has implemented a number of various alternatives, individually and in combination. Specifically, the FCC has
advocated the use of time channeling, screening, user identification, access codes, and credit card payments.6 3 However, the federal courts, surely with no help from the Supreme Court, have not
told us what combination is the least restrictive mechanism. The
Second Circuit has held that a regulation requiring the offeror of
sexually-oriented pre-recorded telephone messages to adopt a system of payment by credit card, user identification, or access code
was constitutional.6 4 However, many alternatives exist. Until the
Supreme Court decides which alternative or combination of alternatives is the least restrictive, the lower courts will have to assess
each case on its own facts.6
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2839 (emphasis added).
62. See supra text accompanying note 32.
63. Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2833-34.
64. Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1988).
65. For an excellent discussion of the possible alternatives, see Comment, Telephones,
Sex, and the First Amendment, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1221 (1986) (suggesting that blocking is
the least restrictive alternative).
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IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's holding in Sable that the government
may not impose an absolute ban on indecent speech but that it
could restrict such speech if the regulation was narrowly drawn to
achieve the legitimate interest of protecting children from exposure to indecent dial-a-porn messages, has failed to resolve numerous issues. The Supreme Court must resolve these issues to ensure
proper first amendment protection as it relates to obscene and indecent language.
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